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Introduction 
A vast literature shows that laws and legal institutions explain international differences in financial development 
(La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1997, 1998, 2000; henceforth LLSV). In particular, debt 
enforcement laws that improve creditor protection allow lenders to enforce debt contracts in a predictable 
manner, either in court or through foreclosure proceedings, which in turn affects the lending practices of 
financial institutions. Further, there is extensive macro- and micro-level evidence that law and institutions 
governing enforcement affect firm borrowing, investment, and economic growth.1 There is, however, little 
empirical evidence on the underlying mechanisms through which laws and institutions affect lending.  
In this paper, we provide novel evidence on the importance of one mechanism— the impact creditor 
protection and debt enforcement procedures have on expected liquidation values on collateral and through this 
on the composition of assets securing a loan. We study expected liquidation values by measuring the expected 
recovery rate on collateral, defined as the ratio of the bank’s ex ante appraised liquidation value to the fair 
market value of the pledged asset. We show that the expected recovery rate directly affects lending decisions by 
informing loan-to-value ratios and debt capacity, which in turn is expected to affect firm and economy-wide 
outcomes. 
An extensive theoretical literature, starting with Barro (1976), Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), Aghion and 
Bolton (1992), Hart and Moore (1994, 1998), shows that pledging collateral increases firms’ debt capacity. 
Providing creditors with the right to liquidate pledged assets if the firm defaults disciplines the firm, reduces the 
risk of strategic default through the threat of liquidation upon non-repayment, and enables financing ex ante. 
Crucial for this mechanism are creditors’ expected liquidation values on the pledged assets (i.e., the amount they 
can expect to receive if they seize the pledge assets and sell them in the open market), which are expected to 
increase in creditor protection. All assets, however, are not made equal. A key maintained assumption in this 
literature, which has not been confirmed empirically, is that movable assets (e.g., inventory and accounts 
                                                            
1 See, e.g., Boot, Aivazian, Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (2001), Giannetti (2003); Qian and Strahan (2007), 
Haselmann, Pistor, and Vig (2010); Cerqueiro, Ongena, and Roszbach (2016); and Calomiris, Larrain, Liberti and Sturgess 
(2017).  
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receivable) are less pledgeable and more vulnerable to weak creditor rights than immovable assets (e.g., real 
estate), because, for example, they are less redeployable, depreciate faster, are subject to agency concerns.2  
Stronger creditor protection can impact financial contracting through at least two channels. First, 
stronger creditor protection leads to higher expected liquidation values. Second, to the degree that expected 
liquidation values on movable assets are more sensitive to creditor protection, the menu of assets that a firm can 
pledge as collateral becomes larger. Thus, creditor protection that improves creditors’ bargaining power in 
default should increase firms’ debt capacity. However, this increase in creditors’ bargaining power may result in 
a liquidation bias, which in turn reduces debtors’ demand for credit (Aghion, Hart, and Moore, 1992 and Hart et 
al., 1997). As shown in Gennaioli and Rossi (2013), allocating the controlling creditor a security interest on a 
firm’s current and future cash flows from movable assets, such as inventory and accounts receivable, can act as 
an “equity stake” in the reorganized firm, attenuating their liquidation bias.  
We use this theoretical framework to formulate predictions on how creditor protection and enforcement 
procedures affect expected recovery rates, the composition of pledged assets, and in turn the firm’s debt 
capacity. The first set of tests we perform builds on the incomplete contracting literature and focuses on how the 
expected liquidation values of assets varies across asset class and creditor protection. The second set of tests 
examines predictions from Gennaioli and Rossi (2013) on how creditor protection shifts the composition of 
collateral pledged to a controlling creditor towards movable assets. The third set of tests directly examine how 
liquidation values relate to loan-to-value ratios and loan interest rates.   
Our study uses a novel cross-country micro-level data set containing secured loans for all small and 
medium businesses issued by an anonymous global bank (henceforth GlobalBank) in 16 emerging market 
countries. There are several advantages of using this data set.  
First, the data provides information on both the type of asset being pledged as collateral and two separate 
liquidation values for the pledged asset. The first is the fair market value (FMV) or replacement market value of 
the collateral securing a loan. Importantly, the FMV is independent of the expected costs of debt enforcement. 
                                                            
2 See, for example, Hart and Moore (1994, 1998) and Gennaioli and Rossi (2013). 
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The second value is the orderly liquidation value (OLV). OLV is equal to the FMV minus the bank’s expected 
costs of repossessing and liquidating the pledged assets given the country’s institutional framework and 
efficiency of enforcement. This allows us to construct comparable expected recovery rates (Recovery Rates) as 
the OLV-to-FMV ratio for each asset pledged, measuring the expected liquidation value per $1 market value of 
the pledged asset (i.e., the fraction of the collateral value that the bank expects to recover in liquidation). 
Importantly, the information on OLVs and FMVs is available for a wide class of assets across countries 
with varying degrees of creditor protection, allowing us to bring key assumptions and predictions of the financial 
contracting literature to the data. Constructing expected recovery rates is something that the previous literature 
has been unable to do due to lack of data on the expected liquidation values of pledged assets. Further, data 
availability on loan contracts allows us to study how higher expected recovery rates on pledged assets influence 
the bank’s credit supply in the form of higher loan-to-value ratios and lower borrowing costs. 
A second advantage of the data is that using only one bank is beneficial as the secured loans offered are 
comparable across all countries. Since the bank’s approval processes are similar across countries, we ensure that 
differences in the internal organization of lending within the GlobalBank do not contaminate our estimations.  
We start by examining how expected recovery rates on collateral vary across asset class and creditor 
protection. We distinguish collateral as movable and immovable as it is standard in the collateral law literature 
and measure cross-country differences in creditor protection using the creditor rights index developed by LLSV 
and updated in Djankov, McLiesh, and Shleifer (2007) to focus on the ability of a creditors to maintain control in 
reorganizations.3,4 We estimate the within-country spread in the Recovery Rate between movable and immovable 
                                                            
3 Movable assets, as opposed to immovable assets, consist of all non–real estate assets (such as machinery, account 
receivables, and inventory). We define movable assets according to Chapter 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC). 
Liberti and Mian (2009) and Calomiris, Larrain, Liberti and Sturgess (2017) classify assets in a similar way. 
4 The index is the sum of four variables measuring the relative power of secured creditors in reorganizations: (1) the 
requirement of creditor consent when a debtor files for reorganization (Reorganization Restrictions), (2) the ability of a 
creditor to seize collateral once a petition for reorganization is approved (No Automatic Stay), (3) whether secured creditors 
are paid first in liquidation (Secured Creditors First), and (4) whether the incumbent management does not retain control of 
the firm during reorganization (Management Doesn’t Say). The index ranges between 0 and 4, with higher values indicating 
higher creditor rights. 
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collateral and how this spread varies with creditor protection in a difference-in-differences framework with 
country fixed effects.  
Identification relies on using recovery rates instead of liquidation values to directly absorb all valuation 
features common to FMV and OLV within an asset and the identification assumption is that that any omitted 
valuation factors affect both movable and immovable collateral equally within a country. Thus, any alternate 
mechanism explaining our results must differentially affect recovery rates on movable and immovable assets 
within the same country. One such factor may be due to systematic differences in secondary markets across 
countries due to differences in asset specificity or redeployability (Shleifer and Vishny, 1992; Williamson, 
1988). Such factors, which are potentially specific to an industry or asset class and time-varying, may pose an 
identification threat if they systematically correlate with creditor rights. To address this concern, we also 
estimate specifications with country-industry-time and industry-collateral type-time fixed effects, which absorb 
time-series variation in recovery rates at the country-industry level and industry-asset class level, respectively.  
We find that expected recovery rates on movable collateral are systematically lower than on immovable 
collateral. Our within-country estimates point to an average spread of about 30 percentage points. The size of the 
spread is systematically larger in weak creditor rights countries by about 31 percentage points: it is 44.8 
percentage points in weak creditor rights countries as opposed to only 14.1 percentage points in strong creditor 
rights countries, consistent with the maintained assumption in the literature that weak creditor rights have more 
detrimental effects on the liquidation values of movable rather than immovable assets.  
One concern in interpreting our results is the influence of omitted country factors on the composition of 
the borrower pool that might affect the distribution of collateral supply and liquidation values within a country. 
To mitigate this concern, we re-estimate the effect of the law on recovery rates within the same borrower. This 
within borrower specification relies on the identification assumption that firm characteristics affect recovery 
rates of movable and immovable collateral equally. Therefore, any alternative explanation must be able to 
explain variation in recovery rates across movable and immovable collateral within the same firm. Using this 
approach, the difference-in-differences estimate of the bank’s expected recovery rates between immovable and 
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movable collateral across debt enforcement strength is larger, suggesting that ignoring variation due to borrower 
composition underestimates the true effect.  
Next, we focus on collateral composition. We find that the likelihood that a loan is secured with 
movable collateral increases in creditor rights. The average frequency of movable-backed loans is 14 percentage 
points higher in strong creditor rights countries than in weak creditor-rights countries. We also find that 
collateral composition moves away from immovable collateral—either alone or bundled with movable assets— 
in countries with stronger creditor protection. Combined, this evidence implies that collateral menu expands 
under stronger protection with movable assets becoming a viable alternative to immovable collateral, consistent 
with the theoretical work by Gennaioli and Rossi (2013) showing that movable collateral should be used in 
countries with stronger creditor protection to overcome the liquidation bias. 
To better understand the economic mechanism driving our results we also explore different aspects of 
creditor rights and movable collateral that drive the empirical relation between the bank’s expected recovery 
rates and creditor protection. We study alternate enforcement laws and institutions that govern creditors’ 
bargaining power and control rights in default, characterized by both “rules in the books” and efficiency of 
enforcement in practice.5 We find that efficient enforcement of debt contracts and security interests, in terms of 
both procedure and timing, are important. Enforcement that is slow or grants control to management in 
reorganization decisions is found to be particularly costly for movable assets, consistent with the notion that such 
assets depreciate faster and are more prone to agency problems. We also distinguish movable collateral into 
“physical” (e.g., machinery and equipment) and “non-physical” (i.e., inventory and account receivables). We 
find that while our results hold for both types of movable collateral, they are stronger for non-physical movable 
assets that are closest to the academic “cash flow” definition of movable collateral used in the financial 
contracting literature.  
                                                            
5 We open-up the LLSV index into its individual components, we explore the role of movable collateral laws using data 
from the World Bank’s Doing Business legal rights index, the procedure that is most likely to be used to resolve an 
insolvency in country from Djankov, Hart, McLeish, and Shleifer (2008), the quality of a country’s legal system as 
measured by the number of days it takes to enforce a payment dispute through the courts from Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-
de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2003), and the presence of information sharing through credit registries and private credit bureaus.  
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Turning to the link between the bank’s expected recovery rates on collateral and the firm’s debt capacity 
we show that higher expected recovery rates on pledged assets translate into higher loan-to-value ratios (higher 
quantities) and lower loan interest rates (lower prices) across loans within the same firm, consistent with an 
increase in the firm’s debt capacity. One standard deviation increase in the Recovery Rate of about 25 percentage 
points is associated with a 17.45 percentage points increase in the loan-to-value ratio and a 23 basis points 
decrease in the loan interest rate. This result, combined with our earlier findings on expected recovery rates and 
collateral composition, is consistent with an equilibrium effect in which stronger creditor protection increases the 
bank’s credit supply by improving their recovery rates and enlarging the set of asset types firms can pledge as 
collateral.  
Finally, to evaluate the credibility of our key explanatory variable, we also contrast the bank’s expected 
recovery rates against the bank’s ex post realized recovery rates on collateral of defaulted loans that the bank 
enforced. We find a positive relation between the two variables, suggesting that the bank’s expected recovery 
rates are useful in terms of assessing their actual recoveries in the future.  
The paper contributes to the literature by providing a first empirical test of key assumptions and 
predictions of the financial contracting literature studying firms’ debt capacity and optimal capital structure 
under incomplete contracts (e.g., Aghion and Bolton, 1992; Hart and Moore, 1994, 1998; Gennaioli and Rossi, 
2013). Such tests were previously not possible due to the lack of data on expected liquidation values on pledged 
assets.  
The paper also contributes to the vast empirical literature relating law and finance with the usage of 
collateral by providing direct evidence on one of the underlying mechanisms driving previously established 
associations between creditor rights and financial development— namely, the impact creditor rights and debt 
enforcement procedures have on expected recovery rates and composition of pledged assets. The analysis in our 
paper is complementary to Calomiris, Larrain, Liberti, and Sturgess (2017) who show that loan-to-value ratios of 
loans collateralized with movable assets made by the same bank are lower in countries with weak collateral laws. 
These authors show that debt capacity is greater in economies with stronger collateral laws, but they are silent 
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about the underlying mechanisms behind this association. Our paper identifies the impact creditor rights have on 
expected recovery rates and composition of collateral and, in turn, on firms’ debt capacity. Other potential 
mechanisms driving this association include the direct impact of creditor rights on borrowers’ probability of 
default. We hold this mechanism constant by exploiting within-borrower variation. Similar to DHMS, our focus 
is on the efficiency of debt enforcement and its impact on lenders’ expected recovery rates, holding other related 
channels constant. 
We also contribute to the empirical literature studying the relation between liquidation values and firms’ 
access to credit and terms of credit. A few studies show that proxies for higher liquidation values on assets 
pledged as collateral are associated with larger loans with longer maturities, lower interest rates and higher credit 
ratings (e.g., Benmelech Garmaise, and Moskowitz, 2005; Benmelech, 2009; Benmelech and Bergman, 2008 
and 2009; Chaney, Sraer and Thesmar, 2011). To proxy variation in the liquidation value of assets, they use 
variation in asset specificity or redeployabily by exploiting, for example, commercial zoning regulations, number 
of potential buyers in secondary markets. By observing liquidation values directly, we are able to shed light on 
the specific laws and institutions that enhance the use collateral, holding constant the role of such factors. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 1 we outline the theoretical framework 
that guides our analysis and specify a set of testable empirical predictions we bring to the data. In Section 2 we 
describe the data in more detail. In Section 3 we discuss our empirical strategy. In Section 4 we present our 
findings on how creditor protection affects the expected recovery rates and the composition of assets securing 
loans. In Section 5 we explore how expected recovery rates affect loan-to-value ratios and interest rates. In 
Section 6 we study how expected recovery rates map into realized recoveries. Conclusions follow in Section 7.  
1. Theoretical Framework and Testable Predictions  
In this section we discuss the theoretical framework that guides our empirical analysis. We bring together the 
parts of the theoretical literature (their key assumptions and predictions) that are most relevant to our empirical 
analysis. We focus on the mechanisms that drive the empirical relation between collateral and firm’s debt 
capacity and their interaction with creditor protection.  
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Starting with Barro (1976), Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), Aghion and Bolton (1992), Hart and Moore 
(1994, 1998), among others, an extensive theoretical literature shows that in the presence of contract 
incompleteness, collateral increases a firm’s debt capacity. Providing creditors with the right to liquidate the 
pledged assets if the firm defaults on its contractual obligations acts as a strong disciplinary device on borrowers, 
which enables financing ex ante. Strategic default is averted by the threat of liquidation upon non-repayment. 
The firm’s debt capacity and optimal financial structure is shown to depend crucially on the expected 
liquidation values of the firm’s pledged assets i.e., the amount that creditors can expect to receive if they seize 
the pledged assets from the borrower and sell them in the open market. A key maintained assumption in these 
models is that firm cash flows, y, (movable collateral) are less pledgeable than physical collateral, L, (immovable 
collateral). In Hart and Moore (1998) the entrepreneur can “divert” the project cash flows on a one-to-one basis, 
while she cannot “steal” the physical assets underlying the project. The firm’s debt capacity in this case is 
entirely determined by the expected liquidation values of the firm’s pledged immovable assets, L. The 
assumption that movable collateral can be fully diverted is of course extreme, which taken literally would be at 
odds with the fact that movable assets are sometimes pledged as collateral (see, e.g., Cerqueiro et al., 2016, 
Calomiris et al., 2017).  
Although incomplete contracting models of financial contracting employ the key assumption that firm 
movable assets are less pledgeable than immovable assets due to lower expected liquidation values, this has not 
been confirmed empirically due to a lack of data on expected asset liquidation values. 
Prediction 1: Movable collateral has lower expected liquidation values than immovable collateral.  
Maintaining Hart and Moore’s assumption that immovable collateral is less pledgeable than immovable 
collateral, Gennaioli and Rossi (2013) allow the pledgeability of movable assets to increase with creditor rights 
and study how the firm’s optimal debt structure varies with creditor protection.6 In their setting, stronger investor 
protection safeguards the investor from managerial “tunneling” increasing the share ߙ	of the firm’s cash flows, 
                                                            
6 In the spirit of Hart and Moore, Gennaioli and Rossi maintain the assumption that immovable collateral is fully 
pledgeable. Immovable collateral could be assumed to be partially pledgeable and their results would go through as along as 
movable collateral remains less pledgeable than immovable collateral. 
 
 
9
ݕ, that the entrepreneur can be legally compelled to pay to the investor ex post and can therefore credibly 
pledged to the investor ex ante. Hence, the firm’s debt capacity increases to ܮ ൅ ߙ ∙ ݕ, where ߙ ∙ ݕ represents the 
expected liquidation value of movable collateral. 
Prediction 2: The expected liquidation values on movable collateral are more sensitive to creditor protection 
than the expected liquidation values on immovable collateral. 
Stronger investor protection does not come without costs. Aghion, Hart, and Moore (1992) and Hart et 
al. (2007) show that stronger investor protection creates incentives for lenders to liquidate assets over 
restructuring and therefore a liquidation bias may exist. With this in mind, Gennaioli and Rossi (2013) allow 
firms to pledge both movable and immovable collateral and show that the optimal capital structure consists of 
two classes of creditors. One class is concentrated in a large creditor (e.g., a bank) who has exclusive control 
over the liquidation vs. reorganization decision of the defaulting firm. The other debt class is dispersed among 
small creditors with no control rights (e.g., trade creditors).  
The first best outcome is that the large creditor is allocated control rights over liquidation and receives a 
combination of movable collateral, which removes the controlling creditor's liquidation bias, and immovable 
collateral. Giving the controlling creditor movable collateral acts as an equity stake in the reorganized firm, 
incentivizing the lender to restructure instead of prematurely liquidating the firm. Where immovable assets are 
pledged to the controlling creditor, under-collateralization in immovable assets—a novel feature in their 
analysis— can also serve to attenuate the liquidation bias. The degree to which the controlling creditor can be 
pledged movable assets will depend on the pledgeability of movable assets, which will in turn depend on the 
strength of creditor protection and the expected liquidation value on movable collateral, ߙ ∙ ݕ.  
Prediction 3: The likelihood that loans are secured with movable collateral increases in creditor protection. 
Since the pledgeability of movable assets increases with creditor protection, a key implication of 
Gennaioli and Rossi’s model is not only that movable collateral should be used more but that the composition of 
collateral should also change with creditor protection. Specifically, the higher pledgeability of movable assets in 
countries with stronger creditor protection should result in the controlling creditor receiving movable assets 
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instead of immovable assets because pledging movable collateral becomes a viable alternate mechanism for 
attenuating the liquidation bias. Hence, one might expect to observe collateral composition evolving from 
immovables-only, to a combination of immovables and movables, and finally to movables-only as creditor 
protection strengthens.  
Prediction 4: The composition of collateral should move away from immovable collateral and towards movable 
collateral as creditor protection strengthens. 
Prediction 4 yields two empirical predictions. First, the use of immovable collateral should decrease with 
creditor protection, which is in accordance with prediction 3. Second, bundling of immovable collateral and 
movable collateral should also decrease with creditor protection, such that when creditor protection is at its 
strongest the controlling creditor receives only movable collateral because movable assets both are highly 
pledgeable under strong creditor prediction and attenuate the liquidation bias. Predictions 3 and 4 combined 
imply that immovable collateral is used less, both alone and combined with movable collateral, in countries with 
stronger creditor protection that enhances the pledgeability of movable assets. 
Finally, we can examine if stronger creditor protection that enhances recovery rates increases a firm’s 
debt capacity by increasing credit supply, consistent with the incomplete contracting models of financial 
contracting. These theories predict that GlobalBank’s expected recovery rates map into higher loans-to-value 
ratios and lower interest rates. In this regard it is important to note, that while we have detailed information on 
the GlobalBank’s expected liquidation values on pledged assets, we have limited balance sheet information 
about the firm. This prevents us from directly testing predictions about the composition of the firm’s debt and 
allocation of control across multiple creditors. This also means that we cannot test if stronger creditor protection 
leads to a contraction in demand for credit as has been documented in recent work (Acharya et al., 2011, 
Lilienfeld-Toal, Mookherjee, and Visaria, 2012, Vig, 2013, and Schoenherr, 2018).  
In the next section, we explain in detail how we bring these predictions to the data. 
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2. Empirical Strategy 
Data availability on the GlobalBank’s expected liquidation values on a wide class of assets and across countries 
with varying degrees of investor protection allows us to bring these key assumptions and predictions of the 
theoretical literature to the data. To map theory to the data we make a few important steps, including 
assumptions that we later relax. Throughout, we assume that the GlobalBank is the firm’s large creditor, 
consistent with the bank receiving control rights via secured lending. We outline all additional steps in detail 
below. 
To test prediction 1, we estimate the share of movable assets that can be pledged to the lender ex-ante, 
i.e., ߙ, by examining how the GlobalBank’s ex ante appraised liquidation values (i.e., at origination) on movable 
assets vary compared to liquidation values of immovable assets. As indicated earlier, we observe two separate 
liquidation values for each asset. The first liquidation value is the fair market value (FMV) or replacement 
market value of the collateral being pledged for a particular loan. The second liquidation value is the orderly 
liquidation value (OLV), which is the liquidation value given the country’s institutional framework and 
efficiency of enforcement.7 We construct comparable expected recovery rates as the ratio of OLV-to-FMV for 
each asset pledged, measuring the expected liquidation value per $1 market value of asset pledged. This measure 
maps directly into the fraction ߙ of collateral value that is not lost in liquidation. Studying recovery rates instead 
of liquidation values directly absorbs all valuation features common to FMV and OLV within an asset. 8  
Hence, to test prediction 1, we estimate the average difference in the bank’s expected recovery rates 
between movable and immovable collateral within each country using the following model: 
Recovery Ratek,i,c,t = αc + αt + αj + β1Movablek + γ1Firmi,t + εk,i,c,t.  (1) 
                                                            
7 Section 3 provides more detail on the definition and measurement of the fair market value and orderly liquidation value. 
 
8 To the extent that market values reflect not only fundamentals but also market imperfections (see, for example, Duffie, 
2010), asset pledgability might affect market values. The FMV in that case should not only reflect the fundamental value, 
but also the OLV, which would bias the FMV downwards towards the OLV and result in an attenuation of cross-sectional 
differences in recovery rates. If so, our estimates would underestimate the effect of creditor protection on recovery rates. 
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where Recovery Ratek,i,c,t denotes the bank’s expected recovery rate on asset class k securing a loan to borrower i 
in country c, originated at time t. αc, αt, and αj denote country, time, and industry fixed effects, respectively. 
Movablek is a (0, 1) dummy variable indicating whether collateral k is movable or not. Firmi,t is a vector of time-
varying firm characteristics at time t. εk,i,c,t is the idiosyncratic error term. The coefficient β1 measures the 
average difference in Recovery Rate between movable and immovable collateral. We expect β1 to be negative, 
consistent with prediction 1 that movable collateral has lower expected liquidation values than immovable 
collateral. 
To test prediction, 2 we compare the difference between the Recovery Rate on movable and immovable 
collateral in countries with strong relative to weak enforcement laws using an augmented specification: 
Recovery Ratek,i,c,t = αc + αt + αj + β1Movablek + β2Movablek × Creditor Rightsc + γ1Firmi,t + εk,i,c,t.  (2) 
where Creditor Rightsc is a dummy variable equal to 1 in HCR economies and zero otherwise, which is our 
benchmark measure of creditor protection. The coefficients of interest are β1 and β2. The coefficient β1 measures 
the average difference in the Recovery Rate between movable and immovable collateral in LCR countries. β2 
measures the difference in the Recovery Rate between movable and immovable collateral in strong creditor 
rights countries, relative to weak-creditor-rights countries. We expect β1 to be negative, but we expect this spread 
to be dampened by laws that protect creditors, and thus β2 should be positive.  
Evaluating the impact of creditor protection in a difference-in-difference framework with country fixed 
effects absorbs all valuation features common to recovery rates within a country. Our identification assumption 
is that that any omitted valuation factors affect both movable and immovable collateral equally within a country. 
Thus, any alternate mechanism explaining our results must differentially affect recovery rates on movable and 
immovable assets within the same country. One such factor may be due to systematic differences in secondary 
markets across countries due to differences in asset specificity or redeployability (Shleifer and Vishny, 1992; 
Williamson, 1988). Such factors, which are potentially specific to an industry or asset class and time-varying, 
may pose an identification threat if they systematically correlate with creditor rights. To address this concern, we 
also estimate specifications with country-industry-time and industry-collateral type-time fixed effects, which 
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absorb time-series variation in recovery rates at the country-industry level and industry-asset class level, 
respectively. 
We also include each country’s economic development, measured as the GDP per capita, and also 
interact this with movable collateral. While GDP per capita correlates with factors we aim to study (i.e., richer 
countries have stronger creditor rights), it also correlates with many other country characteristics that may affect 
liquidation values on pledged assets—institutional or not— and allows us to evaluate whether such factors are 
likely to affect movable and immovable collateral differently, violating our identification assumption. 
A second concern with equation (2) relates to omitted factors within a country that may threaten the 
internal validity of our estimates such as borrowers that pledge movable and immovable collateral within the 
same country may differ in some unobservable way that explains differences in liquidation values. To address 
this concern, we also include borrower fixed effects, αi, and exploit the within-borrower variation across 
different types of collateral. This allows us to estimate the difference in liquidation values across collateral types 
for the same borrower and then contrast how this within-borrower difference varies across creditor rights.  
To test prediction 3, we examine how collateral composition within countries varies with creditor 
protection by estimating the following model: 
Pr(Movable Collateral)k,i,c,t = αt + αj + β1Creditor Rightsc + γ1Firmi,t + εk,i,c,t.  (3) 
where Movable Ratek,i,c,t is a dummy variable equal to one if the loan is secured with movable collateral, and is 
equal zero otherwise. We expect β1 to be positive, consistent with prediction 3 that the likelihood that loans are 
secured with movable collateral increases with strength of creditor protection.  
Similarly, we test prediction 4 by examining how collateral composition within a borrower varies with 
creditor protection by estimating: 
Pr(Bundled | Movable Collateral)k,i,c,t = αt + αj + β1Creditor Rightsc + γ1Firmi,t + εk,i,c,t,  (4) 
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where the sample in (4) includes all loans secured with movable collateral and the dependent variable, 
Bundledk,i,c,t, is a dummy variable that equals one if a loan is secured with “bundled” collateral i.e., both movable 
and immovable collateral are pledged against the same loan. We expect β1 to be negative, consistent with 
prediction 4 that the likelihood that a loan is secured with immovable collateral decreases in creditor protection. 
Throughout, we employ the terminology movable and immovable collateral that is commonly used in 
law (see UCC Chapter 9 in the U.S. and World Bank collateral law data), regulation (see the E.U. Single Rule 
Book), and hence by lenders. This classification differs slightly from the academic classification of physical 
assets and cash flows that is common to incomplete contracting models of financial contracting. In additional 
tests, we also open up movable collateral into physical (i.e., equipment) and non-physical (i.e., inventory and 
accounts receivable) to examine more precisely how ߙ varies by creditor protection.  
In sum, our identification relies on using recovery rates instead of liquidation values to directly absorb 
all valuation features common to FMV and OLV within an asset, within borrower estimates to absorb borrower 
selection concerns across collateral type, and the assumption that other country characteristics affect recovery 
rates on movable and immovable assets equally. In addition, we show that our results are robust to valuation 
concerns relating to redeployability and liquidity in secondary markets through the inclusion of country-
industry-time and industry-collateral type-time fixed effects. Nonetheless, as with any study of this nature, it is 
possible that: i) our results obtained in emerging market countries are not generalizable to developed countries 
with deeper financial markets and more sophisticated institutions; and ii) laws evolved because countries with a 
comparative advantage in movable-asset sectors had a greater need to develop creditor protection that improves 
the enforcement of movable collateral. 
3. Data Description 
Our data comes primarily from three sources: the small and medium-sized enterprise (SME) lending division of 
the GlobalBank; law and finance literature focused on debt enforcement including La Porta et al. (1997, 1998, 
and 2000), Djankov et al. (2007), and Djankov et al. (2008); and the World Bank’s Doing Business index.  
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GlobalBank provided data on secured loans it made to small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) 
during the years 2002–2004 in 16 emerging market countries. We have access to all the asset-backed programs 
that GlobalBank developed in emerging markets during the early 2000s as part of an “embedded bank” strategy. 
One of the main goals of this strategy was for GlobalBank to act as a local bank in order to compete with other 
local banks in these regions. The asset-backed program includes loans that are collateralized by one or a 
combination of movables (equipment, machinery, inventory and accounts receivable) and immovables, which 
comprise of real estate assets and financial assets (cash, guarantees, and letters of credit).  
The data in our analysis expand the original data used in Liberti and Mian (2010) and Calomiris, 
Larrain, Liberti and Sturgess (2017) by including measures of the orderly liquidation value of assets pledged as 
collateral and the interest rate for each loan, which were unavailable to both of these studies. The new data 
allows us to observe two separate liquidation values for each asset, both determined by external independent 
accredited appraisers at loan origination. The first liquidation value is the fair market value (FMV) or 
replacement market value of the collateral being pledged for a particular loan.9 This is the gross price, expressed 
in terms of money, that a willing and informed buyer would be expected to pay to a willing and informed seller 
when neither is under pressure to conclude the transaction. Importantly, this fair market value is independent of 
the firm’s financing choices, the expected costs of debt enforcement, or a discount due to asset fire sales or the 
presence of constrained buyers, as in Shleifer and Vishny (1992), for example. 
The second liquidation value is the orderly liquidation value (OLV). It is equal to the FMV minus the 
bank’s expected costs of repossessing and liquidating the pledged assets given the country’s institutional 
framework and efficiency of enforcement. The OLV is an estimate of the gross amount that the asset would fetch 
in an auction-style liquidation allowing for a reasonable period of time (typically no more than 180 days) to 
identify all potential buyers. The ability to seize the asset, the time to repossess the asset and the expected resale 
                                                            
9 The definition of FMV includes assets in continued use and installed, as well as those that need to be removed. In the case 
of assets in continued use or installed, the FMV includes all direct and indirect costs of installation and assembly to make 
the assets fully operational. In the case of removal of the asset, the FMV includes the cost of removal of the asset to another 
location. The American Society of Appraisers defines FMV as follows: “the estimated amount, expressed in terms of 
money, that may reasonably be expected for a property in an exchange between a willing buyer and a willing seller, with 
equity to both, neither under any compulsion to buy or sell, and both fully aware of all relevant facts, as of a specific date.” 
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value in a secondary market conditional on getting the asset back are part of the dimensions contained in this 
measure. The OLV will reflect these conditions by reducing the value of the asset directly. In other words, OLV 
represents the bank’s expected liquidation value of the asset under normal market conditions—not under fire-
sale or forced-sale conditions.10 
With regard to the appraisal process for FMVs and OLVs, the external appraisers use a market value 
approach to estimate the price the asset could be sold for in the market under different conditions. This is the 
standard approach used in secure-based lending since it focuses on the liquidation value of the asset, rather than 
using the cost-based approach, which uses the reproduction or replacement cost of the asset. The market 
approach is based on historical auction sale transactions of similar assets.11 Both the FMV and OLV are 
appraised at loan origination, and hence are expected liquidation values. 
We combine the FMV and OLV to construct the expected recovery rate (Recovery Rate) on collateral as 
the ratio OLV/FMV. As mentioned earlier, the Recovery Rate measures the liquidation value per $1 market 
value of collateral pledged and by construction, the ratio absorbs all valuation features common to FMV and 
OLV within an asset pledged by a firm. Hence, the Recovery Rate provides a unique real-world estimate of the 
expected loss in collateral values when enforcing a security interest. Table A1 in the appendix provides summary 
statistics for the Recovery Rate and key variables used in the analysis from GlobalBank. For each borrowing 
firm, we observe the loan origination, the industry they are operating in, their size and internal risk rating as 
determined by the bank, and key balance sheet characteristics. For every loan origination, we observe the 
outstanding loan amount, the interest rate spread, the liquidation values and type of collateral (“asset class”) 
securing each loan.  
To test predictions 1 and 2 we examine the Recovery Rates on collateral within-country and within-
borrower. In our cross-sectional within-country tests, our sample includes 10,146 firm-asset observations for 
                                                            
10 The American Society of Appraisers defines OLV as “the estimated gross amount, expressed in terms of money, that 
could be typically realized from a liquidation sale, given a reasonable period of time to find a purchaser (or purchasers), 
with the seller being compelled to sell on an as-is, where-is basis, as of a specific date.” 
11 A third method, the income approach, is based on discounting future cash flows of the assets. This approach is seldom 
used in practice since it assumes that a particular cash flow stream can be matched to a particular asset. 
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7,422 firms in our sample of 16 countries.12 For our cross-sectional within-firm tests in which we compare 
Recovery Rates across asset types within the same firm, our sample includes 4,744 firm-asset observations 
pledged by 2,002 firms. Table 1 provides an overview of our sample. For each country, we report the number of 
observations in our empirical analysis, the number of unique firms, and enforcement characteristics.  
(Insert Table 1 about here) 
To measure differences across countries in strength of enforcement laws, we examine two main 
dimensions of creditor rights: “rules in the books” and efficiency of enforcement in practice. As a benchmark 
indicator of “rules in the books,” we use the creditor rights index taken from Djankov, McLiesh, and Shleifer 
(2007).13 The index is the sum of four variables that capture the relative power of secured creditors in bankruptcy 
proceedings: (1) the requirement of creditor consent when a debtor files for reorganization (Reorganization 
Restrictions), (2) the ability of a creditor to seize collateral once a petition for reorganization is approved (No 
Automatic Stay), (3) whether secured creditors are paid first in liquidation (Secured Creditors First), and (4) 
whether the incumbent management does not retain control of the firm during reorganization (Management 
Doesn’t Stay). The index ranges between 0 and 4, with higher values indicating higher creditor rights. In the 
analysis, we use both the LLSV index and its individual components.  
As alternative measure of rules in the books, we also use the strength of collateral law index taken from 
the World Bank’s 2005 Doing Business Survey (DB). The eight features of the index cover three aspects of the 
movable collateral law: Collateral Creation, Collateral Registry, and Collateral Enforcement. Creation measures 
the legal scope of movable assets to be pledged as collateral: monitoring measures whether creditors can ensure 
                                                            
12 Our original dataset has 12,591 unique firms. However, we can only make use of a sample of 7,422 unique firms. We lose 
766 firms that were already in default at the beginning of the sample period. These firms are not actively borrowing during 
the sample period. We also lose 1,406 firms that do not draw any loan from the bank during our sample period. We also lose 
2,997 firms for which we lack data for some of our key variables, such as collateral and firm characteristics.  
13 DMS updated and extended the LLSV index for a larger set of countries than those covered in LLSV.  
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that other lenders do not have security rights over the same assets, and enforcement measures whether the law 
allows parties to contractually agree to out-of-court enforcement for movable collateral.14 
To capture the efficiency of enforcement in practice, we employ two indicators: Contract Days and 
Enforcement Procedure. Contract Days is an indicator of the efficiency of the judicial system measuring the 
number of days it takes to resolve a payment dispute through the court system taken from Djankov, La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2003; hereafter DLLS). Enforcement Procedure is a survey-based indicator 
developed by DHMS. It indicates which procedure (foreclosure, reorganization, or liquidation) is more likely to 
be used according to insolvency practitioners to recover a security interest in a hypothetical case of an insolvent 
firm given the country’s laws and institutions.15 To capture information sharing we use a dummy variable 
indicating whether a public credit registry or a private credit bureau is operational in the country, taken from 
Djankov, McLiesh, and Shleifer (2007). Although not an enforcement procedure, information sharing 
institutions facilitate the screening and monitoring of borrowers (see, e.g., Jappelli and Pagano 1993; Padilla and 
Pagano 1997, 2000; Djankov, McLiesh, and Shleifer, 2007) and could influence banks’ recovery rates on 
pledged assets by decreasing double-pledging and tunneling possibilities. 
                                                            
14 Construction of the index follows Calomiris et al. (2017). The movable collateral law (MC Law) index they use includes 
the following seven categories: (1) the law allows for non-possessory security interests over movable assets, without 
requiring a specific description of the collateral; (2) the law allows a business to grant a non-possessory security right in 
substantially all its movable assets, without requiring a specific description of the collateral; (3) a security right may be 
given over future or after-acquired movable assets and may extend automatically to the products, proceeds, or replacements 
of the original assets; (4) a general description of debts and obligations is permitted in the collateral agreement and in 
registration documents; all types of debts and obligations can be secured between the parties, and the collateral agreement 
can include a maximum amount for which the assets are encumbered; (5) secured creditors are paid first (e.g., before tax 
claims and employee claims) when the debtor defaults outside an insolvency procedure; (6) a collateral registry or 
registration institution for security interests over movable property is in operation; (7) the law allows parties to agree in a 
movable collateral agreement that the lender may enforce its security right out of court. Collateral Creation is determined 
by adding one for each one of the first five components, and creating a dummy variable equal to one if the sum is above the 
median sum across countries and zero otherwise. Collateral Registry and Collateral Enforcement are equal to one if the 
sixth and seventh components are equal to one, and zero otherwise. 
15 The DHMS countries cover all but two of our countries, India and Pakistan. In our tests focusing on procedures from 
DHMS, we classify these countries as following the default procedure. Results are robust to dropping these two countries. 
In addition, DHMS collected and studied several other characteristics of a country’s bankruptcy law with the goal of 
understanding which features of the law may be more conducive to an efficient enforcement from the secured creditors’ 
perspective. We abstain from investigating individual characteristics of the bankruptcy law used in DHMS because we do 
not always have sufficient variation in our sample.  
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Table 1 reveals that there is a great deal of heterogeneity with respect to creditor rights in our sample. 
For example, 6 of the 16 sample countries are classified as high creditor rights index (HCR equals 1 where the 
index takes a value of 3 or 4), while the remaining 10 countries are classified as low creditor rights (LCR). In 
terms of observations, 54 percent of originations are from HCR countries. There is also substantial variation with 
respect to the individual components of the LLSV index—with the exception of Secured Creditors First, which 
features in 75 percent of the countries in our sample. The strength of the collateral law index also varies 
significantly across the sample, with some countries having very high values (8 out of 8) and others having very 
low values (2 out of 8). Going beyond “rules in the books,” we also observe substantial variation in Contract 
Days, with Singapore and Brazil at the two extremes of the spectrum. Similarly, each of the three enforcement 
procedures is equally represented in the sample. With respect to information sharing, 44 percent of the countries 
have a Public Registry in place and 50 percent have a Private Bureau. 
4. Debt enforcement and GlobalBank’s secured lending 
In this section, we analyze how the GlobalBank’s recovery rates vary between immovable and movable 
collateral (prediction 1) and how differences in debt enforcement across countries affect these valuations 
(prediction 2) as well as the type of collateral employed in the GlobalBank’s loans (predictions 3 and 4). 
4.1. Recovery rates, movable collateral, and creditor rights 
We start by examining how the expected recovery rate in each country varies with creditor rights. In 
Figure 1 we provide descriptive statistics for the average Recovery Rate at the country level plotted against 
creditor rights. The slope of this relation is positive and significant. A country-level regression of Recovery Rate 
on the creditor right index yields a coefficient of 0.097, which is statistically significant at the 5%-level. 
(Insert Figure 1 about here) 
In Table 2, we provide descriptive statistics on recovery rates by creditor protection and asset type. The 
average Recovery Rate for our sample is 0.805, but varies significantly across immovable and movable assets. 
Consistent with prediction 1, we find that the bank’s expected recovery rate for movable collateral is 
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significantly lower than for immovable collateral (63.1% as opposed to 98.5%; a difference of -35.4 percentage 
points that is statistically significant at the 5%-level). Interestingly, immovable collateral has an expected 
recovery rate near 100%, consistent with the full pledgeability assumption, typically maintained in the 
theoretical literature. 
(Insert Table 2 about here) 
The bank’s expected recovery rates also vary systematically across creditor rights. The average Recovery 
Rate is 91.3% in HCR countries and 74.1% in LCR countries. The difference of 17.2 percentage points is 
statistically significant at the 1%-level, which indicates that GlobalBank assigns higher recovery valuations to 
assets in countries with strong debt enforcement. Opening up further by collateral type, we observe that the 
Recovery Rate on movable collateral are much lower in LCR than in HCR countries (53.7% for LCR countries 
versus 78.9% for HCR countries). The Recovery Rate on movable collateral are instead very similar (98.3% for 
LCR countries versus 98.9% for HCR countries). This is consistent with prediction 2 that weak creditor rights 
have a more detrimental effects on the liquidation values of movable assets than immovable assets, reflected in 
the 24.7% difference-in-difference in average recovery rates between movable and immovable collateral. 
To formally test predictions 1 and 2 we estimate equations (1) and (2) to compare GlobalBank’s 
expected recovery rates on movable and immovable collateral across all countries controlling for country-, time-, 
industry-fixed effects and borrower characteristics.16 The results are presented in Table 3. In column (1), we find 
that the Recovery Rate on movable collateral is lower than the Recovery Rate on immovable collateral, 
consistent with prediction 1. Our estimates point to an average within-country spread in the expected recovery 
rates of movable and immovable collateral of 30.2 percentage points, which is comparable to the univariate 
estimates in Table 2. 
(Insert Table 3 about here) 
                                                            
16 Throughout, standard errors are clustered at the country level and computed using block bootstrapping owing to the small 
number of clusters (see, for example, Cameron et al. 2008). Additionally, in unreported results, we re-run the tests in 
columns (1) to (4), but cluster standard errors at the country-industry level. Results are stronger than clustering at the 
country level. 
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In column (2), we examine how the recovery rate spread compares across weak and strong creditor 
rights countries. Consistent with prediction 2, the spread is substantially more pronounced in weak-creditor-
rights countries. Our estimates indicate an average spread of –44.8 percentage points in weak-creditor-rights 
countries as opposed to only –14.1 percentage points with strong-creditor-rights countries. The difference 
between these two values, captured by the interaction term, indicates that expected recovery rates on movable 
relative to immovable collateral are 30.7 percentage points higher in countries with strong creditor rights, 
relative to countries with weak creditor rights. This difference-in-differences estimate suggests that creditor 
rights have a large impact on expected recovery rates, particularly on movable collateral.17   
Comparisons of the estimates in Table 3 with the univariate difference-in-differences of 24.7 percent in 
Table 2 reveals that failing to account for possible confounding factors at the country level tends to 
underestimate the impact of creditor rights by around 24 percent ((0.307 – 0.247)/0.247). Relative to the average 
recovery rate on movable collateral in weak-rights countries, reported in Table 2, our difference-in-differences 
estimate suggests that stronger creditor rights increase recovery rates on movable collateral by 57 percent 
(0.307/0.537).  
One potential concern with our estimates in column (2) is that differences in secondary markets across 
countries that differentially affect movable assets, such as asset redeployability or asset specificity, may bias our 
estimates. Such omitted country characteristics, which are potentially specific to an industry or asset class and 
time-varying, may pose an identification threat if they systematically correlate with creditor rights. For the most 
part, the literature has measured asset redeployability or asset specificity at the industry-level (see Stromberg, 
2000; Acharya, Bharath, and Srinivasan, 2007; and Kim and Kung, 2017).18 Hence to address this concern, in 
                                                            
17 Table 1 showed that some countries had a substantially larger number of observations than other countries. In unreported 
regressions, we collapse the number of observations at the country-level, retaining one observation per country. In 
particular, we first run 16 country-level regressions of equation (1), excluding country-level effects. We then regress the 
estimated coefficient of Movable on a constant, Creditor Rights and Creditor Rights × Movable. The estimated coefficients 
of Movable is 0.424***, and the interaction term between Creditor Rights and Movable is 0.257**. Similar results hold 
when we apply weighted least squares with as weight “1/number of observations per country.”  
18 Rare exceptions that examine redeploaybility within an asset class include Benmelech Garmaise, and Moskowitz (2005) 
Benmelech (2009), and Bergman and Benmelech (2009). 
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column (3) we allow for country-industry-time and industry-asset-time fixed effects.19 If results were due to 
larger discounts on movable assets because of lower redeployability or more illiquid secondary markets in weak 
creditor rights countries, these specification would absorb these effects. Results, however, are very similar to 
those obtained in column (2) suggesting that these factors are unlikely to be driving our results.  
To further examine whether omitted country characteristics threaten the internal validity of our 
estimates, we also allow for an interaction between movable collateral and GDP per capita. The coefficient of 
the interaction between Movable and Creditor Rights remains positive and statistically significant. Its size is 
somewhat smaller, which is expected given the positive correlation between GDP per capita and creditor rights.20 
The coefficient of the interaction term with GDP per capita is statistically insignificant and close to zero, 
suggesting again that omitted country characteristics are unlikely to affect movable and immovable collateral 
differently. 
The results in columns (1) – (4) likely understate the degree to which recovery rates are affected by 
creditor rights for two reasons. First, in the absence of strong creditor protection, the composition of borrowers is 
likely to shift toward more seasoned credit risks. Second, in responses to weak creditor protection and weak 
enforcement laws, lenders are also expected to demand better-quality collateral (prediction 4). 
To help mitigate this downward bias and obtain a more precise measure of the true effect, we examine 
the effect of creditor rights on recovery rates in a borrower fixed effects framework. The sample size reduces 
from 10,146 to 4,744 because, as shown in Table 1, only 2,022 borrowers pledge multiple collateral types in 
4,744 observations. Results are reported in column (5). They are qualitatively unchanged with those reported 
earlier, but the magnitude of coefficient on the interaction between Movable and Creditor Rights increases by 
approximately 10 percent. In column (6) we report results from a specification including country-industry-time 
and industry-collateral type-time. Again, this specification absorbs valuation effects that might be due, for 
example, to local economic fluctuations faced by an industry or specific to an asset type within a particular 
                                                            
19 The coefficient on Movable is absorbed in the specifications with industry-asset-time fixed effects. 
20 The pairwise correlation between GDP per capita and Creditor Rights is 0.489 and statistically significant. 
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industry. Results are again qualitatively unchanged, but the magnitude of coefficient on the interaction between 
Movable and Creditor Rights increases by approximately 10 percent. 
4.2. Collateral composition and creditor rights 
Next, we analyze the relation between creditor protection and collateral composition. For each of the 16 
countries in our sample, we calculate the frequency of movable-backed loans. In Figure 2 we provide descriptive 
statistics for the average frequency of movable-backed loans at the country level plotted against creditor rights. 
The slope of this relation is positive and statistically significant. In particular, the average frequency of movable-
backed loans is 63% in HCR countries and 43% in LCR countries. The difference of 20 percentage points is 
statistically significant at the 5% level, which indicates that GlobalBank lends more frequently against movable 
assets in countries that have strong creditor protection, consistent with prediction 3 that the pledgeability of 
movable collateral increases in creditor rights. 
(Insert Figure 2 about here) 
In Figure 3, we examine how collateral bundling (i.e., when a loan is backed by both movable and 
immovable collateral) varies with creditor protection. For each of the 16 countries in our sample, we calculate 
the frequency of movable-backed loans that are also backed by immovable collateral. We find that the average 
frequency of bundle-backed loans is 5% in HCR countries and 17% in LCR countries. The difference of 12 
percentage points is statistically significant at the 10% level. This inverse relationship between credit protection 
and collateral bundling is consistent with prediction 4 that as the pledging movable collateral becomes a viable 
alternative in strong creditor rights countries, the need for collateral bundling with immovable assets decreases. 
(Insert Figure 3 about here) 
In Table 4, we examine how debt enforcement affects collateral composition in a regression framework 
including firm characteristics and industry and time fixed effects. This helps mitigate the selection concern that 
the collateral compositions observed in Figures 3 and 4 are due to differences in borrower composition. In 
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column (1) we estimate equation (3) to focus on the proportion of loans backed with movable collateral.21 The 
average frequency of movable-backed loans is 14 percentage points higher in HCR countries, which is 
significant at the 5% level. In column (2) we estimate equation (5) to examine collateral bundling for the 5,426 
of 8,695 loans that have at least some movable assets pledged as collateral. We find that the average frequency 
of bundle-backed loans is 16 percentage points lower in HCR countries, which is significant at the 1%-level. 
Combined, Table 4 and Figures 2 and 3 are consistent with the notion that stronger creditor protection is 
associated with a larger collateral menu that in particular allows firms to pledge movable assets as collateral and 
enhance their debt capacity. As the pledgeability of movable assets increases, the need for both pledging 
immovable collateral and collateral bundling with immovable assets decreases. 
(Insert Table 4 about here) 
The fact that we find a difference in Recovery Rates for movables lending between weak and strong 
enforcement despite the shift away from movable collateral in weak-enforcement countries indicates that 
collateral composition may be constrained by supply-side factors. The observed patterns suggest that although 
lenders may attempt to overcome enforcement frictions by requiring more attractive collateral in LCR countries, 
their ability to do so is limited and in response they price enforcement costs into expected recovery rates. 
4.3. Further evidence on debt enforcement laws and collateral types 
In this section, we dig deeper into the economic mechanisms driving our results by looking at the 
different aspects of creditor protection and types of movable collateral (“physical” vs. “non-physical”) that drive 
the empirical relation between the bank’s expected recovery rates and creditor protection. 
To better understand the facets of creditor protection and debt enforcement law that affect expected 
recovery rates on movable collateral versus immovable collateral, we examine alternate enforcement laws and 
institutions that govern creditors’ bargaining power and control rights in default, characterized by “rules in the 
books” and efficiency of enforcement in practice. We focus on the individual components of the creditor right 
                                                            
21 The number of observations is lower than the 10,146 presented in Table 1 because we focus on loan-level observations in 
Table 4, and some loans are backed with multiple forms of collateral. 
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index from LLSV; law on the use of movable collateral from the World Bank Doing Business index and 
Calomiris, Larrain, Liberti and Sturgess (2017); survey evidence on the enforcement procedure and efficiency of 
judgment from Djankov et al. (2008); and whether a country has a public credit registry or private bureau.22 
In Table 5, we evaluate the impact of these procedures on Globalbank’s expected recovery rates on 
movable and immovable collateral using our difference-in-differences approach with borrower fixed effects. In 
column (1) we focus on the four components of the creditor right index. We find that the variables No Automatic 
Stay, and Management Doesn’t Stay both matter for expected recovery rates on movable collateral. Specifically, 
recovery rates are higher on movable assets for borrowers in countries where there is no automatic stay on the 
assets of a firm, that might prevent a secured creditor enforcing, or where management does not stay and 
maintain control of assets throughout enforcement. Importantly, since our focus is on how enforcement affects 
recovery rates on movables versus immovable for the same borrower, the results in column (1) imply that 
valuations on movable assets are uniquely adversely affected by management maintaining control in 
enforcement. One potential explanation consistent with theory is that management have greater bargaining 
power over movable assets because management has a greater opportunity to tunnel movable assets than 
immovable assets. 
(Insert Table 5 about here) 
Next, we explore the role of movable collateral laws, using data from the World Bank’s Doing Business 
legal rights index. Following Calomiris, Larrain, Liberti and Sturgess (2017), we build three indicators that 
reflect the strength of movable collateral law: Collateral Creation, Collateral Registry, and Collateral 
Enforcement. In column (2) of Table 5, we report the within-borrower estimates of equation (2) where we 
include the three components of movable collateral law in addition to the creditor rights index. We find that the 
Recovery Rate on movable collateral relative to immovable collateral are substantially higher in countries with 
stronger movable collateral laws, specifically in relation to collateral enforcement, which allows creditors to 
enforce claims on movable assets. The effect of creditor protection on movable collateral recovery rates, which 
                                                            
22 Appendix Table A3 presents pairwise correlations between the alternate enforcement variables. 
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captures broader creditor power, are smaller but remain significant when we examine enforceability of movable 
collateral.23  
In column (3), we examine how the expected enforcement procedure in DHMS affects the expected 
recovery rates. Using a representative insolvency case of a midsize firm, DHMS asked insolvency practitioners 
in each country to determine which enforcement procedure (foreclosure, liquidation, or attempt for 
reorganization) is more likely to be used given the country’s bankruptcy laws and institutions. Countries where 
foreclosure is the most likely procedure exhibit higher expected recovery rates. DMHS found that foreclosure 
works extremely well when combined with an “out-of-court enforcement”, which may be particularly valuable 
for movable assets if management control is associated with lower recovery rates, as we find above. This 
underlines again that creditors expect higher recover values if they can expect to maintain power in enforcement, 
which helps alleviate agency problems pertaining to movable assets during enforcement.  
Next, we study how the bank’s expected recovery rates on movable collateral vary with the quality of its 
legal system as measured by the number of days that it takes to enforce a payment dispute through the courts, 
Log Contract Days. The measure is taken from Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2003). 
Pairwise correlations in Appendix Table A3 indicate that countries with inefficient courts tend to have lower 
expected recovery rates on collateral, have weaker creditor rights, and are less likely to enable out-of-court 
enforcement of security interests. Estimates in column (4) of Table 5 indicate that expected recovery rates on 
movable collateral relative to immovable collateral are substantially lower in countries where enforcing a 
contract through the courts takes longer, even after taking into account the strength of debt enforcement. Long 
enforcement times might adversely affect movable assets, such as inventory, because they exhibit both higher 
depreciation rates and lower redeployablility than immovable assets such as real estate.  
                                                            
23 Pairwise correlations in Appendix Table 3 indicate that countries where the scope of using movable assets as collateral is 
high also exhibit stronger creditor rights. This indicates that the use of movable collateral increases as the institutional 
framework improves, consistent with the main thesis of the paper that movable assets are more susceptible to the 
inefficiencies induced by a weak institutional framework, and therefore, their use requires a stronger institutional 
framework. 
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In the last column of Table 5, we explore the role of information sharing through a credit registry or 
private credit bureau. Information sharing allows creditors to better screen and monitor borrowers (see, for 
example, Jappelli and Pagano 1993 and Padilla and Pagano 1997, 2000). Estimation results in column (5) 
indicate that expected recovery rates on movable collateral relative to immovable collateral are 38.6 percentage 
points higher when information sharing is present over and above the more general creditor rights index. 
The results in Table 5 indicate that efficient enforcement of debt contracts and security interests, in 
terms of both procedure and timing, are particularly important in explaining variation in the bank’s expected 
recovery rates on movable assets. The results on enforcement procedure, out-of-court enforcement on movable 
collateral, and information sharing show that laws and institutions that allocate more control to creditors increase 
recovery rates in addition to the broader role of creditor protection. Two potential and complementary 
interpretations of these findings are: i) allocating greater bargaining power to creditors alleviates strategic default 
concerns; and ii) enforcement that is slow or grants control to management in reorganization decisions is 
especially costly for movable assets that are less redeployable, depreciate faster, and are subject to agency 
concerns. 
To examine more precisely how creditor protection affects recovery rates on movable assets, we 
decompose movable collateral into movable collateral that is “physical” (e.g., machinery and equipment) and 
“non-physical” in the sense that it represents a security interest on the firm’s current and future cash flows from 
“floating assets” such as inventory and accounts receivables. We present results that test predictions 1 and 2 by 
estimating equations (1) and (2) in Table 6. We find that while our earlier results hold for both types of movable 
collateral, they are stronger, both economically and statistically, for movable assets that are closest to the 
academic “cash flow” definition of movable collateral that is used in the financial contracting literature.  
(Insert Table 6 about here) 
5. LTV ratios, loan interest rates, and expected recovery rates 
In this section, we study how stronger creditor protection work through recovery rates on pledged assets to 
enhance the firm’s debt capacity. In particular, we examine how LTV ratios and interest rates of loans backed 
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with movable assets versus immovable assets vary with creditor protection. We use our within borrower 
framework to mitigate borrower selection concerns and focus on borrowers that contract with GlobalBank by 
pledging movable and immovable collateral against two or more distinct loans.  
These borrowers are a subsample of the sample of borrowers we study in columns (5)-(7) of Table 3, 
which comprises both borrowers that pledge movable and immovable collateral at the same time against the 
same loan and those that pledge movable and immovable collateral against multiple loans. We focus on 
borrowers that pledge movable and immovable collateral against multiple loans because LTV ratios and interest 
rates are observed at the loan level, and therefore we are unable to identify differences in interest rates across 
collateral types within the same borrower when multiple collateral types support the same loan. This subsample 
includes 1,350 of the original 4,744 observations. 
We begin in Table 7 by providing descriptive statistics. Panel A provides descriptive statistics for LTV 
ratios. The average LTV ratio in our sample is 70.5% (i.e., the bank lends 70.5 cents against each $ of collateral 
value). Consistent with movable collateral being less pledgeable than immovable collateral, the average LTV 
ratio for movable collateral is 58.4% relative to 82.8% for immovable collateral. Consistent with stronger 
creditor protection increasing the pledgeability of movable assets, the average LTV ratios for loans backed by 
movable collateral increase by 39.4 percentage points (from 41.4% to 80.9%) as we move from LCR to HCR 
countries. Loans backed by immovable collateral have consistently high LTV ratios and increase only by 4.4 
percentage points (from 80.7% to 85.1%) as we move from LCR to HCR countries, pointing to a difference-in-
difference spread in LTV ratios of 35 percentage points. 
(Insert Table 7 about here) 
Panel B provides descriptive statistics for interest rates. The loan interest rate available in our data is the 
net spread— the gross interest rate charged on the loan minus the marginal cost of lending. Examining 
differences across collateral types, interest rates are 72.3 basis points higher in LCR countries, which is 
equivalent to an increase of 10.7% relative to interest rates in HCR countries. Interest rates are, on average, 55.4 
basis points higher for loans backed with movable collateral than loans backed with immovable collateral. 
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However, the interest rate spread on movable over immovable collateral is higher in LCR countries (0.837 basis 
points) than in HCR countries (0.171 basis points). A difference-in-differences comparison of interest rate 
spreads on movables versus immovable across creditor rights shows that loan interest rates are 66.6 basis points 
higher on movable loans than immovable loans in LCR countries compared with HCR countries.  
In Panel C, we confirm that the expected recovery rates in the sub-sample of 1,350 observations vary 
with creditor rights and collateral type in the same way as for the full sample, reported in Table 2.  
In Table 8 we study how the LTV ratios and interest rates vary with recovery rates in a cross-sectional 
difference-in-differences framework with borrower fixed effects. This allows us to directly map the bank’s 
expected recovery rates on assets securing a loan to the equilibrium loan quantity and price. This comparison is 
made within the same borrower, controlling for borrower and time fixed effects as well as other loan and 
borrower characteristics (including the GlobalBank’s assessment of credit risk) and it is thus free from 
unobserved heterogeneity issues that generally plague test of the empirical relation between collateral and loan 
supply. 
(Insert Table 8 about here) 
We find that conditional on $1 of market value of pledged collateral, a higher expected recovery rate on 
the pledged assets is associated with higher LTV ratios (higher quantity) and lower loan interest rates (lower 
price). In terms of magnitudes, our estimates indicate that a one standard deviation increase in the expected 
recovery rate of 25 percentage points is associated with a 17.45 percentage points increase in the LTV ratio and a 
23 basis points decreases in the loan interest rate. The combination of a positive effect on quantities and negative 
effect on price rules out that a positive shift in the demand for credit is driving our results (which would yield a 
positive change in quantities and prices). This result, combined with the results in Table 3 and 4, is consistent 
with an equilibrium effect in which stronger creditor protection increases debt capacity through improving 
recovery rates and enlarging the set of asset types that can be pledged as collateral.  
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6. Expected recovery rates and realized recoveries 
In the final part of the paper, we contrast the bank’s expected recovery rate with actual recovery rates from the 
bank’s lending program. Information on actual recovery rates on collateral and actual recovery rates on loans are 
available in the data at the aggregate country level.24 This enables us to gain some additional insights on the 
credibility of our key explanatory variable and the bank’s lending behavior.  
To provide further credibility to our analysis, we correlate, at the country level, the actual recovery rates 
on collateral for loans in our sample with the expected recovery rates on collateral. Figure 4 shows a positive and 
significant correlation (0.56) between the expected and actual recovery rates on collateral, suggesting that the 
bank’s expected recovery rates are insightful in predicting the actual recovery of the collateral. 
(Insert Figure 4 about here) 
In Figure 5 we also plot the relation between the expected recovery rates on collateral and the actual 
recovery rates on loans. If the lender prices weak enforcement into lending decisions through the expected 
recovery rate on collateral, then lower expected recovery rates should result in lower loan-to-value ratios and 
higher borrowing costs, as shown in Table 8, but not necessarily lower recovery rates on loans. We find this is 
indeed the case. This suggests that banks are able to overcome inefficiencies in the legal and institutional 
environment through private contracting—admittedly not without consequences to borrowers— consistent with 
insights from the law and finance literature. 
(Insert Figure 5 about here) 
7. Concluding Remarks 
Collateral is central to secured debt contracts. One of the defining characteristics of collateral is the value a 
creditor expects to recover upon default, which ultimately decides the cost of credit and the borrower’s debt 
                                                            
24 We observe only the final recovery rates on both collateral and loans, but not the details on the loans or the enforcement 
procedure either at the borrower-level or on aggregate. 
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capacity. In this paper, we exploit a unique cross-country data set to show that enforcement law and institutions 
are a primary determinant in explaining liquidation values from the perspective of a creditor.  
We find that expected recovery rates on movable collateral are systematically lower than on immovable 
collateral by about 30 percentage points. The size of this difference is systematically larger in weak creditor 
rights. It is 44.8 percentage points in weak creditor rights countries as opposed to only 14.1 percentage points in 
strong creditor rights countries, consistent with the maintained assumption in the financial contracting literature 
that weak creditor rights have more detrimental effects on the liquidation values of movable assets. These results 
are robust to identification concerns regarding borrower composition and differences in the liquidity of 
secondary markets.  
Additional analysis, exploring different aspects of creditor rights, both in the books and in practice, 
reveals that the efficient enforcement of debt contracts and security interests, in terms of both procedures and 
timing, has a large impact on liquidation values of pledged assets. Enforcement that is slow or grants control to 
management in reorganization decisions is found to be particularly costly for movable assets, consistent with the 
idea that such assets depreciate faster and are more prone to agency problems. 
In terms of collateral composition, we find that as creditor protection improves, there is a move away 
from immovable collateral towards movable collateral—either alone or bundled with movable assets. In 
particular, we find that the average frequency of movable-backed loans is 14 percentage points higher in strong 
creditor rights countries than in weak creditor-rights countries. Similarly, the average frequency of bundle-
backed loans is 16 percentage points lower in strong creditor rights countries than in weak creditor rights 
countries. These results imply that under strong protection, the collateral menu expands with movable assets 
becoming a viable alternative to immovable collateral, consistent with the theoretical work by Gennaioli and 
Rossi (2013). 
Overall, our results provide novel evidence confirming key assumptions and predictions of the financial 
contracting literature and shows that recovery rates on pledged assets is an important first-stage mechanism 
 
 
32 
through which creditor protection affects firms’ debt capacity and terms of credit. We show that higher expected 
recovery rates on pledged assets translate into a higher loan-to-value ratios and lower loan interest rates. 
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Figure 1 
Expected Recovery Rates and Creditor Rights: Country-Level Evidence 
This figure plots the relationship between a country’s creditor rights index and the country average expected recovery rate 
on collateral. Expected recovery rate on collateral is defined as the ratio of orderly liquidation value (OLV) over the fair 
market value (FMV) of the asset. The creditor rights index is an index from 1 to 4 aggregating different creditor rights, 
following La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998). The average is taken during the period 2002–2004. 
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Figure 2 
Movable Collateral Composition and Creditor Rights: Country-Level Evidence 
This figure plots the relationship between a country’s creditor rights index and the fraction of loans secured with movable 
collateral. Movable collateral includes accounts receivable, equipment & vehicles, and firm-specific assets. The creditor 
rights index is an index from 1 to 4 aggregating different creditor rights, following La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and 
Vishny (1998). The average is taken during the period 2002–2004. 
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Figure 3 
Collateral Bundling and Creditor Rights: Country-Level Evidence 
This figure plots the relationship between a country’s creditor rights index and the fraction of loans secured with movable 
collateral that are also secured with immovable collateral (movable collateral is bundled with immovable collateral). 
Movable collateral includes accounts receivable, equipment & vehicles, and firm-specific assets. Immovable collateral 
includes land, real estate, and financial assets such as cash, letters of credit, and guarantees. The creditor rights index is an 
index from 1 to 4 aggregating different creditor rights, following La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998). 
The average is taken during the period 2002–2004. 
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Figure 4 
Actual Recovery Rates on Collateral and Expected Recovery Rates on Collateral: Country-Level Evidence 
This figure plots the relation between the expected recovery rate on collateral and the actual recovery rate on 
collateral at the country level. The average is taken during the period 2002–2004. Actual Recovery Rate on 
Collateral is provided by the bank’s lending program on an aggregate basis at the country level and represents 
the actual recovery rate on a dollar of collateral value. Expected Recovery Rate on Collateral is the average 
expected recovery rate on a dollar of collateral value for all borrowers in each country. The number of countries 
is reduced from 16 to 14 since there are no data available on actual recovery rates on collateral for two countries. 
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Figure 5 
Actual Recovery Rates on Loans and Expected Recovery Rates on Collateral: Country-Level Evidence 
This figure plots the relation between expected recovery rate on collateral against the actual recovery rate on loans at the 
country level. The average is taken during the period 2002–2004. Actual Recovery Rate on Loans is provided by the bank’s 
lending program on an aggregate basis at the country level and represents the actual recovery rate on a dollar lent to a 
borrower. Expected Recovery Rate on Collateral is the average expected recovery rate on a dollar of collateral value for all 
borrowers in each country. The number of countries is reduced from 16 to 14 since there are no data available on actual 
recovery rates on loans for two countries.  
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Table 1 
Data Description by Country and Sample Comparison with DHMS 
This table presents the distribution of data by country along with indicators of creditor rights in each country. The data come from a sample of 7,422 small and 
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in 16 economies that are borrowing from the SMEs lending division of a large multinational bank. The countries are reported in 
alphabetical order. The top row indicates the data source. The last two rows compare our sample to the sample used in DHMS. Table A2 in the Appendix provides 
detailed definitions for all variables and the respective sources. 
Enforcement in Practice Information SharingRules in the booksSample
DB Enforcement Procedure
# Obs # Firms # Obs # Firms  Index Reorganization Restrictions
No Automatic 
Stay
Secured 
Creditors First
Management 
doesn't Stay
Collateral 
Law Index
Contract 
Days Foreclosure Reorganization Liquidation
Public 
Registry
Private 
Bureau
(1) (2) (3) (4) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15)
1 Brazil         201       201 1 0 1 0 0 2 566 0 0 1 1 1
2 Chile 442        348      154      60        2 0 1 1 0 3 305 1 0 0 1 1
3 Czech 674        631      86        43        3 0 1 1 1 5 300 0 0 1 1 1
4 Hong Kong 1,404     1,277   254      127      4 1 1 1 1 8 211 1 0 0 0 0
5 Hungary 342        227      194      79        1 1 0 0 0 6 365 1 0 0 0 1
6 India 1,379     602      1,182   405      2 1 0 1 0 5 425 0 0
7 Korea 1,811     1,213   1,176   578      3 0 1 1 1 6 75 0 1 0 0 1
8 Malaysia 773        627      272      126      3 1 1 1 0 8 300 0 0 1 1 1
9 Pakistan 256        96        226      66        1 0 0 1 0 5 395 1 0
10 Romania 154        134      39        19        2 0 1 1 0 6 335 0 1 0 0 0
11 Singapore 276        241      67        32        3 0 1 1 1 8 69 1 0 0 0 0
12 Slovakia 275        157      191      73        2 0 1 1 0 8 565 0 0 1 1 0
13 South Africa 551        395      286      130      3 1 0 1 1 8 277 0 0 1 0 1
14 Sri Lanka 86          86        2 1 0 0 1 2 440 1 0 0 0 1
15 Taiwan 426        373      105      52        2 0 0 1 1 3 210 0 1 0 1 1
16 Turkey 1,096     814      512      230      2 1 1 0 0 3 330 0 1 0 1 0
10,146   7,422   4,744   2,020   2.19 0.44 0.56 0.75 0.44 5.375 323 0.36 0.29 0.36 0.44 0.50
All Borrowers Multiple Assets
Country
Total/Average
   Our sample
Creditor Rights
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Table 2 
Expected Recovery Rates, Collateral Types, and Creditor Rights: Summary Statistics 
This table presents summary statistics for the bank’s expected recovery rates on collateral. Summary statistics 
are provided for all countries in our sample and for high- and low-creditor-rights countries separately, denoted 
as HCR and LCR, respectively. Countries with values of the LLSV creditor rights index equal to or greater than 
3 are classified as HCR countries, while countries with values equal to or lower than 2 are classified as LCR 
countries. The sample is all assets pledged as collateral and the unit of observation is the asset-level. Movable is 
a dummy variable that takes a value of one if the assets collateralizing a loan include accounts receivable, 
equipment & vehicles, and firm-specific assets, and zero otherwise. Immovable is a dummy variable that takes a 
value of one if the assets collateralizing a loan include real estate, financial instruments and bank letters of 
credit, and zero otherwise. Panel A presents all countries, Panel B presents a country-level univariate 
difference-in-differences across LCR and HCR countries and immovable and movable assets, where ***, **, * 
indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels. For each panel, we provide expected recovery 
rates for all collateral classes (Average), break down summary statistics for immovable and movable collateral, 
and report the difference in recovery rates across immovable and movable collateral. Table A2 in the Appendix 
provides definitions for all variables.  
    
  
Panel A: All Countries
Average Non-Movable Movable Diff
All Countries 0.805 0.985 0.631 -0.354**
Panel B: Low vs. High Creditor Rights
Average Non-Movable Movable Diff
LCR 0.741 0.983 0.537 -0.447***
HCR 0.913 0.989 0.789 -0.200**
High CR-Low CR 0.172** 0.006 0.253** 0.247**
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Table 3  
Expected Recovery Rates, Movable Collateral, and Creditor Rights  
This table presents OLS estimates of equations (1) and (2). The dependent variable is the bank’s expected 
recovery rate on collateral. Movable is a dummy variable that equals one if collateral is movable, and zero 
otherwise. Creditor Rights is a dummy variable that equals one if a country’s value of the LLSV creditor rights 
index equals 3 or higher, and zero otherwise. The sample includes assets pledged against the first observation of 
all loans in columns (1)–(4) and the f assets pledged against the first first observation of all loans for borrowers 
with multiple loans only in columns (5) and (6). Columns (1) and (2) include country and time fixed effects, 
columns (3) and (4) include country-industry-time and industry-asset-time fixed effects, column (5) includes 
borrower and time fixed effects, column (6) includes borrower, country-industry-time and industry-asset-time 
fixed effects. Tables A1 and A2 in the Appendix provide descriptive statistics for all variables, including the 
firm characteristics used as controls and definitions, respectively. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at 
the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels. Standard errors clustered using block-bootstrapping at the country level are 
reported in parentheses. 
     
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
    Movable -0.302*** -0.448*** -0.453***
(0.065) (0.054) (0.068)
    Movable × Creditor Rights 0.307*** 0.326*** 0.276** 0.335*** 0.386***
(0.065) (0.071) (0.122) (0.089) (0.074)
    Movable × Log GDP per Capita 0.028
(0.034)
Firm Composition
   Firm Ratings Included Included Included Included Included Included
   Loan Size Included Included Included Included Included Included
   Firm Size Included Included Included Included Included Included
   Balance Sheet Data (4 Ratios) Included Included Included Included Included Included
Fixed Effects
Country Included Included
Borrower Included Included
Time Included Included Included
Industry Included Included
Country-Industry-Time Included Included Included
Industry-Collateral Type-Time Included Included Included
Observations 10,146 10,146 10,146 10,146 4,744 4,744
R-squared 0.43 0.48 0.63 0.63 0.70 0.81
Expected Recovery Rate
Sample
All Borrowers Multiple Assets
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Table 4 
Collateral Composition and Creditor Rights 
This table presents OLS estimates of regression collateral composition on country creditor rights. In column (1) 
the dependent variable is a dummy variable equal to one if a loan is secured with movable collateral. In column 
(2) the dependent variable is a dummy variable equal to one if a loan is secured with bundled collateral, i.e., 
both movable and immovable collateral are pledged against the same loan. The unit of observation is the loan 
level. In column (1) the sample is all loans. In column (2) the sample is all loans with movable collateral 
pledged as security. Creditor Rights is a dummy variable that equals one if a country’s value of the LLSV 
creditor rights index equals 3 or higher, and zero otherwise. Tables A1 and A2 in the Appendix provide 
definitions and descriptive statistics for all variables, including the firm characteristics used as controls. ***, **, 
* indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels. Standard errors clustered using block-
bootstrapping at the country level are reported in parentheses. 
  
Pr(Movable 
Collateral)
Pr(Bundled|Movable 
Collateral)
(1) (2)
     Creditor Rights 0.144** -0.157***
(0.064) (0.040)
Firm Composition
   Firm Ratings Included Included
   Loan Size Included Included
   Firm Size Included Included
   Balance Sheet Data (4 Ratios) Included Included
Fixed Effects
Time Included Included
Industry Included Included
Observations 8,695 5,426
R-squared 0.07 0.13
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Table 5 
Spread in Recovery Rates and Creditor Rights: Going Beyond Creditor Rights 
This table presents OLS estimates of an augmented version of equation (2) that examines alternate enforcement 
law and institutions. The dependent variable is the bank’s expected recovery rate on collateral. Movable is a 
dummy variable that equals one if collateral is movable, and zero otherwise. Creditor Rights is a dummy 
variable that equals one if a country’s value of the LLSV creditor rights index equals 3 or higher, and zero 
otherwise. Collateral Creation measures the ability to write loan contracts with movable collateral and is 
determined by adding one for each one of the first five components, and creating a dummy variable equal to one 
if the sum is above the median sum across countries and zero otherwise. Collateral Registry measures whether a 
movable collateral registry is in operation and is equal to one if the sixth component is equal to one, and zero 
otherwise. Collateral Enforcement measures whether a lender may enforce its security right over movable 
collateral out of court and is equal to one if the seventh component is equal to one, and zero otherwise. The 
sample includes the first observation of all loans for borrowers with multiple loans only. All estimations include 
borrower and time fixed effects. Tables A1 and A2 in the Appendix provide descriptive statistics for all 
variables, including the firm characteristics used as controls and definitions, respectively. ***, **, * indicate 
statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are 
clustered at the country level. 
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
    Movable -0.553* -0.547*** -0.513*** -0.380*** -0.680***
(0.267) (0.094) (0.102) (0.110) (0.008)
    Movable × Reorg. Restrictions 0.095
(0.117)
    Movable × No Automatic Stay 0.185*
(0.097)
    Movable × Secured Creditors First 0.001
(0.250)
    Movable × Management Doesn't Stay 0.242*
(0.124)
    Movable × Collateral Creation -0.157
(0.106)
    Movable × Collateral Registry 0.017
(0.118)
    Movable × Collateral Enforcement 0.383**
(0.139)
    Movable × Foreclosure 0.321**
(0.143)
    Movable × Reorganization 0.121
(0.110)
    Movable × Log Contract Days -0.195**
(0.076)
    Movable × Information Sharing 0.386***
(0.117)
    Movable × Creditor Rights 0.233** 0.294** 0.234* 0.263**
(0.116) (0.104) (0.130) (0.126)
   Firm Ratings Included Included Included Included Included
   Loan Size Included Included Included Included Included
   Firm Size Included Included Included Included Included
   Balance Sheet Data (4 Ratios) Included Included Included Included Included
Fixed Effects
Borrower Included Included Included Included Included
Time Included Included Included Included Included
Observations 4,744 4,744 4,744 4,744 4,744
R-squared 0.72 0.73 0.70 0.72 0.74
Expected Recovery Rate
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Table 6  
Expected Recovery Rates, Non-Physical and Physical Movable Collateral, and Creditor Rights  
This table presents OLS estimates of equations (1) and (2). The dependent variable is the bank’s expected 
recovery rate on collateral. Movable—Non-physical is a dummy variable that equals one if collateral is movable 
and non-physical, and zero otherwise.  Movable—Physical is a dummy variable that equals one if collateral is 
movable and physical, and zero otherwise. Physical movable collateral includes machinery and equipment, Non-
physical movable collateral security interests on the firm’s current and future cash flows from “floating assets” 
such as inventory and accounts receivables. Creditor Rights is a dummy variable that equals one if a country’s 
value of the LLSV creditor rights index equals 3 or higher, and zero otherwise. The sample includes the first 
observation of all loans in columns (1)–(4) and the first observation of all loans for borrowers with multiple 
loans only in columns (5) and (6). Columns (1) and (2) include country and time fixed effects, columns (3) and 
(4) include country-industry-time fixed effects, column (5) includes borrower and time fixed effects, column (6) 
includes borrower, country-industry-time, and industry-collateral type-time fixed effects Tables A1 and A2 in 
the Appendix provide descriptive statistics for all variables, including the firm characteristics used as controls 
and definitions, respectively. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels. 
Standard errors clustered using block-bootstrapping at the country level are reported in parentheses. 
 
 
 
 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
    Movable - Non-physical -0.523*** -0.617*** -0.600***
(0.083) (0.068) (0.061)
    Movable - Physical -0.057 -0.116 -0.122*
(0.047) (0.074) (0.065)
    Movable - Non-physical × Creditor Rights 0.351** 0.412*** 0.649*** 0.380*** 0.422***
(0.118) (0.117) (0.200) (0.103) (0.116)
    Movable - Physical × Creditor Rights 0.091 0.034 0.138 0.104 0.050
(0.077) (0.085) (0.147) (0.071) (0.105)
    Movable - Non-physical × Log GDP per Capita -0.087
(0.054)
    Movable - Physical × Log GDP per Capita -0.061
(0.056)
Firm Composition
   Firm Ratings Included Included Included Included Included Included
   Loan Size Included Included Included Included Included Included
   Firm Size Included Included Included Included Included Included
   Balance Sheet Data (4 Ratios) Included Included Included Included Included Included
Fixed Effects
Country Included Included
Borrower Included Included
Time Included Included Included
Industry Included Included
Country-Industry-Time Included Included Included
Industry-Collateral Type-Time Included Included Included
Observations 10,146 10,146 10,146 10,146 4,744 4,744
R-squared 0.61 0.64 0.81 0.81 0.62 0.90
Expected Recovery Rate
Sample
All Borrowers Multiple Assets
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Table 7 
Loan-to-Value, Interest Rates and Expected Recovery Rates: Univariate Tests 
This table presents summary statistics for the loan-to-value (LTV), loan interest rates and the bank’s expected 
recovery rates on collateral. LTV is the loan-to-value measured as the outstanding loan amount at origination 
divided by the fair market value of pledged collateral. Loan Interest Rate is the interest rate charged to the firm 
by the bank (in %). Summary statistics are provided for all countries in our sample and for high- and low-
creditor-rights countries separately, denoted as HCR and LCR, respectively. Countries with values of the LLSV 
creditor rights index equal to or greater than 3 are classified as HCR countries, while countries with values equal 
to or lower than 2 are classified as LCR countries. Movable is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if the 
assets collateralizing a loan include accounts receivable, equipment & vehicles, and firm-specific assets, and 
zero otherwise. Immovable is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if the assets collateralizing a loan 
include real estate, financial instruments and bank letters of credit, and zero otherwise. The sample includes the 
first observation of all loans for borrowers with multiple loans made at different times only. Panel A, B, and C 
presents the average LTVs, interest rates, and expected recover rates, respectively. Panels also present the 
country-level univariate difference-in-differences across LCR and HCR countries and immovable and movable 
assets, where ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels. Table A2 in the 
Appendix provides definitions for all variables.  
 
 
 
Panel A: Loan-to-Value (LTV) Descriptive Statistics
All Collateral Movable Non-Movable Movable - Non-Movable
N=1,350 N=682 N=668
All Countries (N=1,350) 0.705 0.584 0.828 -0.243***
LCR Countries (N=754) 0.607 0.414 0.809 -0.394***
HCR Countries (N=596) 0.829 0.807 0.851 -0.044**
LCR-HCR Countries -0.222*** -0.392*** -0.042** -0.350***
Panel A: Interest Rate Descriptive Statistics
All Collateral Movable Non-Movable Movable - Non-Movable
N=1,350 N=682 N=668
All Countries (N=1,350) 7.159 7.433 6.879 0.554***
LCR Countries (N=754) 7.478 7.886 7.049 0.837***
HCR Countries (N=596) 6.755 6.841 6.670 0.171
LCR-HCR Countries 0.723*** 1.045*** 0.379 0.666***
Panel C: Expected Recovery Rate Descriptive Statistics
All Collateral Movable Non-Movable Movable - Non-Movable
N=1,350 N=682 N=668
All Countries (N=1,350) 0.798 0.635 0.964 -0.329***
LCR Countries (N=754) 0.712 0.492 0.943 -0.451***
HCR Countries (N=596) 0.905 0.821 0.989 -0.168***
LCR-HCR Countries -0.193*** -0.329*** -0.046** -0.283***
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Table 8 
Loan-to-Value, Loan Interest Rates, Movable Collateral, and Expected Recovery Rates 
This table presents OLS estimates where we explain the loan-to-value (LTV) and loan interest rate as a function 
of the expected recovery rate of the collateral pledged, and a set of control variables. LTV is the loan-to-value 
measured as the outstanding loan amount at origination divided by the fair market value of pledged collateral. 
Loan Interest Rate is the interest rate charged to the firm by the bank (in %). Recovery Rate is the bank’s 
expected recovery rate on the collateral guaranteeing the loan. The sample includes the first observation of all 
loans for borrowers with multiple loans made at different times only. All estimations include borrower and time 
fixed effects. Tables A1 and A2 in the Appendix provide descriptive statistics for all variables, including the 
firm characteristics used as controls, and definitions, respectively. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at 
the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are clustered at the borrower 
level. 
 
     
LTV Interest Rate
(1) (2)
Recovery Rate 0.699*** -0.929***
(0.022) (0.264)
Firm Composition
   Firm Ratings Included Included
   Loan Size Included Included
   Firm Size Included Included
   Balance Sheet Data (4 Ratios) Included Included
Fixed Effects
Borrower Included Included
Time Included Included
Observations 1,350 1,350
R-squared 0.69 0.83
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Appendix: Table A1 
Summary Statistics  
This table presents summary statistics for the variables employed in the empirical analysis. St. Dev stands for 
standard deviation, and Obs. for the number of observations. We have data in 70 industries (at the two-digit SIC 
level). Recovery Rate is the bank’s expected recovery rate on collateral. Movable is a dummy variable that 
equals one if collateral is movable, and zero otherwise. Firm rating is the bank’s ex ante risk grade of the firm, 
with A denoting high-quality firms. Firm size is a sales size indicator (0 to 3) capturing the size of a firm. 
 
Mean St. Dev
Std. Dev. 
within 
Country
Std .Dev. 
within 
Country-
Industry
Std .Dev. 
within 
Borrower
Median Obs.
Borrower Level Information
Recovery Rate = OLV/FMV 0.857 0.253 0.193 0.176 0.148 1 10,146
Movable 0.542 0.498 0.433 0.392 0.367 1 10,146
Interest Rate Spread 7.863 3.618 3.031 2.615 0.628 6.717 10,146
Firm Rating
A = 1 0.926 0.262 0.236 0.185 0.022 1 10,146
B = 2 0.042 0.201 0.187 0.134 0.018 0 10,146
C = 3 0.017 0.129 0.105 0.070 0.008 0 10,146
D = 4 0.015 0.121 0.099 0.064 0.007 0 10,146
Firm Size
0 0.368 0.482 0.378 0.326 0.025 0 10,146
1 0.405 0.491 0.434 0.399 0.035 0 10,146
2 0.154 0.361 0.336 0.295 0.032 0 10,146
3 0.072 0.259 0.225 0.185 0.014 0 10,146
Loan Size (in USD) 530,636 1,030,815 819,000 698,100 209,013 200,000 10,146
Collateralization by Asset Class:
Account Receivables 0.096 0.294 0.188 0.166 0.206 0 10,146
Equipment & Vehicles 0.276 0.447 0.271 0.226 0.189 0 10,146
Firm-Specific Assets 0.170 0.375 0.289 0.266 0.272 0 10,146
Real Estate 0.308 0.462 0.356 0.317 0.234 0 10,146
Financial Instruments 0.123 0.329 0.252 0.213 0.236 0 10,146
Bank Letters of Credit 0.027 0.163 0.122 0.064 0.034 0 10,146
Balance Sheet Information
Cash/Total Assets 0.051 0.039 0.036 0.030 0.007 0.049 10,146
Account Receivables/Total Assets 0.234 0.143 0.113 0.098 0.023 0.255 10,146
PP&E/Total Assets 0.394 0.318 0.238 0.198 0.041 0.312 10,146
Inventory/Total Assets 0.263 0.178 0.156 0.131 0.024 0.233 10,146
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Appendix: Table A2 
Brief Descriptions of Legal and Institutional Variables and Their Sources 
This table provides a description of the legal and institutional variables employed in our analysis. DMS stands for Djankov, McLiesh, and Shleifer (2007), LLSV for La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1997, 1998), DB for the Doing Business index of the World Bank, and DHMS for Djankov, Hart, McLiesh, and Shleifer (2008).  
Variable Definition Source 
LLSV Index An index aggregating different creditor rights, following La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998). The index is formed by 
adding one when: (1) the country imposes restrictions such as 
creditors’ consent or minimum dividends to file for reorganization; (2) 
secured creditors are able to gain possession of their security once the 
reorganization petition has been approved (no automatic stay); (3) 
secured creditors are ranked first in the distribution of the proceeds that 
result from the disposition of the assets of a bankrupt firm; and (4) the 
debtor does not retain the administration of the property pending the 
resolution of the reorganization. The index ranges from 0 to 4.. 
 
DMS—values 
for year 2002  
Reorganization 
Restrictions 
Equals one if the reorganization procedure imposes restrictions such as 
creditors consent; equals zero otherwise. 
DMS—values 
for year 2002 
No Automatic Stay Equals one if the reorganization procedure does not impose an 
automatic stay on the assets of the firm on filing the reorganization 
petition. Automatic stay prevents secured creditors from gaining 
possession of their security. Equals zero if such a restriction does exist 
in the law. 
 
DMS—values 
for year 2002  
Secured Creditors 
First 
Equals one if secured creditors are ranked first in the distribution of the 
proceeds that result from the disposition of the assets of a bankrupt 
firm. Equals zero if imsecured creditors, such as the government and 
workers, are given absolute priority. 
 
DMS—values 
for year 2002  
Management 
Doesn’t Stay 
Equals one when an official appointed by the court, or by the creditors, 
is responsible for the operation of the business during reorganization. 
Equivalently, this variable equals one if the debtor does not retain the 
administration of the property pending the resolution of the 
reorganization process, and equals zero otherwise. 
 
DMS—values 
for year 2002  
Collateral Law 
Index 
The strength of the collateral law index measures the degree to which 
collateral laws protect the rights of borrowers and lenders and thus 
facilitate lending. The strength of collateral law includes eight aspects 
related to legal rights in collateral law. The index ranges from 0 to 8, 
DB—data taken 
from 2005 
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with higher scores indicating that collateral laws are better designed to 
expand access to credit. 
 
Rule of Law Assessment of the law and order tradition in a country. LLSV 
Legal Origin A dummy variable that identifies the legal origin of the bankruptcy law 
of each country. 
DHMS 
Contract Days The number of days to resolve a payment dispute through courts.  DLLS 
Enforcement 
Procedure 
DHMS ask insolvency practitioners which procedure is likely to be 
used in each country for debt enforcement of a hypothetical hotel 
(foreclosure, liquidation, or an attempt at reorganization). 
 
DHMS 
Public Registry A database owned by public authorities (usually the central bank or 
banking supervisory authority), that collect information on the standing 
of borrowers in the financial system and make this information 
available to financial institutions.  
 
DMS 
Private Bureau A private commercial firm or nonprofit organization that maintains a 
database on the standing of borrowers in the financial system. Its 
primary role is to facilitate exchange of information among banks and 
financial institutions. 
DMS 
Collateral Creation Measures the ability to write loan contracts with movable collateral 
and is determined by adding one for each one of the first five 
components that correspond to collateral creation, and creating a 
dummy variable equal to one if the sum is above the median sum 
across countries, and zero otherwise. 
 
Doing Business 
(World Bank) 
—values for 
year 2005  
Collateral Registry Measures whether a movable collateral registry is in operation and 
is equal to one if the sixth component is equal to one, and zero 
otherwise. 
Doing Business 
(World Bank) 
—values for 
year 2005 
Collateral 
Enforcement 
Measures whether a lender may enforce its security right over movable 
collateral out of court and is equal to one if the seventh component is 
equal to one, and zero otherwise. 
 
Doing Business 
(World Bank) 
—values for 
year 2005 
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Asset Specificity The median book value of the industry’s “machinery and equipment + 
inventories” divided by the book value of total assets, employing U.S. 
Compustat data at a two-digit SIC code level. We create a dummy 
variable equal to one when an industry is above-median asset-specific 
and zero otherwise. 
Compustat 
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Appendix: Table A3 
Enforcement Law and Institutions Correlation Matrix 
This table presents a correlation matrix of country-level enforcement law and institutions for the 16 countries in the sample. The first entry includes the correlation coefficient, 
and the second entry includes the p-value. Tables A1 and A2 in the Appendix provide descriptive statistics and definitions, respectively. 
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OLV/FMV 1.000
Creditor Rights 0.629 1.000
0.021
Log GDP per Capita 0.489 0.489 1.000
0.090 0.090
Foreclosure 0.505 0.051 0.483 1.000
0.078 0.868 0.095
Reorganization -0.140 -0.141 0.224 -0.365 1.000
0.649 0.646 0.461 0.220
Log Contract Days -0.612 -0.600 -0.633 -0.270 -0.356 1.000
0.026 0.030 0.020 0.372 0.232
Collateral Creation 0.472 0.720 0.345 0.278 -0.365 -0.351 1.000
0.103 0.006 0.248 0.358 0.220 0.239
Collateral Registry 0.481 0.537 0.367 0.501 -0.433 -0.239 0.843 1.000
0.096 0.059 0.218 0.081 0.139 0.431 0.000
Collateral Enforcement 0.525 0.415 0.321 0.185 0.058 -0.500 0.527 0.625 1.000
0.066 0.159 0.284 0.546 0.851 0.082 0.064 0.022
Information 0.128 -0.033 0.124 -0.178 0.234 0.286 -0.178 -0.101 0.101 1.000
0.677 0.915 0.686 0.561 0.443 0.344 0.561 0.742 0.742
